This study examines how the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) affects auditors' incentives to curtail earnings management by client managers. The most significant reform of PSLRA was the elimination of joint and several liability under which auditors and other parties could be named to lawsuits because of "deep pockets" rather than culpability. While the elimination of joint and several liability provides significant relief to auditors from litigation, opponents of PSLRA argue that it discourages meritorious lawsuits and lowers audit quality, reducing investor confidence in markets. The potential benefit would be greatest for Big 6 firms, who have the highest exposure (largest clients) and significant resources to pay damages. In this paper we argue that if PSLRA induces decreases in audit quality, then we should expect increases in the prevalence of accruals after this Act. To investigate this issue we examine the discretionary accruals of a sample of 2,600 companies three years before and after the act. Our results support this hypothesis. Specifically, we find that after PSLRA income-increasing discretionary accruals rise for auditees of Big 6 firms but not for auditees of non-Big 6 firms.
INTRODUCTION
I n this paper we examine how changes in the legal environment due to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 (PSLRA) affect auditors' incentives to curtail earnings management by client managers. PSLRA was the result of several years of effort by numerous parties, which included the Big 6 firms, to change federal securities laws. An important objective of PSLRA is to reduce frivolous lawsuits against auditors and other parties with "deep pockets."
Prior to 1995, many accounting industry experts, among others, believed that the excessively litigious environment involving the accounting profession was hindering economic growth (e.g., AICPA 1992; Gottlieb and Doroshow 2002) . The Big 6 firms, most affected by the explosion of
Ho Young Lee is an Assistant Professor at the University of Nebraska at Omaha and Vivek Mande is a Professor at California State University, Fullerton.
litigation, issued a Statement of Position in 1992 arguing for extensive reforms in securities laws (Arthus Andersen et al. 1992 ). The single reform most called for by the Big 6 was the elimination of joint and several liability whereby auditors could be named to lawsuits because of their resources (deep pockets) rather than their culpability. In very extreme cases auditors could be held responsible for all damages if the other parties named in the litigation were bankrupt. In their Statement, Big 6 firms argued that if joint and several liability were not eliminated, the supply of auditors' services would decrease, which would negatively affect the proper functioning of the capital markets.
However, opponents of PSLRA (e.g., the Securities Industry Association 2002; American Family Voices 2002) argued that by reducing the amount of damages recoverable and by making it more difficult for investors to bring lawsuits, investors would be discouraged from suing auditors. With a lower probability of suit, it was argued that audit quality would also decrease, reducing investor confidence in the capital markets.
There is anecdotal and empirical evidence suggesting that the passage of PSLRA did make it more difficult for investors to bring securities-related lawsuits against parties with deep pockets, such as auditors and underwriters (e.g., Ali and Kallapur 2001) . Using an analytical model, Chan and Pae (1998) also demonstrate that the elimination of joint and several liability induces auditors to reduce their effort and adopt less conservative auditing procedures. However, there have been virtually no empirical tests examining changes in auditor incentives due to the litigation relief under PSLRA.
We attempt empirically to test the effect of PSLRA by examining discretionary accruals of client managers before and after PSLRA. We argue that if PSLRA induces decreases in audit quality and auditors' conservatism as demonstrated by Chan and Pae (1998), we should expect increases in the prevalence of discretionary accruals, especially income-increasing accruals, by client managers after PSLRA. Because PSLRA's primary impact is on parties with deep pockets, we posit that the reporting flexibility of clients of Big 6 auditors increases more than that of non-Big 6 clients after PSLRA. Our results provide evidence consistent with this expectation.
In the following section, we develop our hypothesis to investigate the impact of changes in the legal environment due to PSLRA on client managers' accounting discretion. In the third section, we discuss the research design, while in the fourth section we present the sample and test results. The last section contains a discussion of the primary findings and avenues for future research.
DEVELOPMENT OF HYPOTHESIS
Prior studies suggest that client managers' accounting choices are influenced by how conservative their auditors are (Antle and Nalebuff 1991; DeFond and Jiambalvo 1993; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998 ). An important concern influencing auditors' accounting preferences, and hence, client managers' accounting discretion, is litigation risk. Hirst (1994) and DeFond and Subramanyam (1998) suggest that in a legal environment that often penalizes auditors for allowing managers' discretion with regard to accounting choices, auditors have greater incentives to monitor managements' reporting flexibility. They argue that when faced with litigation risk, auditors reduce client managers' discretion with regard to accounting accruals or require them to make audit adjustments.
However, these studies have not investigated the effect of changes in the legal environment on client managers' accounting discretion. When the legal environment in the auditing industry changes, auditors' cost structures are affected by the change and their incentives to influence client managers' accounting discretion may be affected. Auditors can maximize their utility by increasing or decreasing the level of their influence on client managers' accounting choices. Latham and Linville (1998) argue that in a competitive market, an auditor's ability to pass increases in liability costs to clients is limited and that one way an auditor can avoid higher liability costs is by screening clients. Another way to minimize the impact of increases in liability costs for a given audit fee is for auditors to adopt more conservative audit procedures, which in turn, as discussed, reduces accounting discretion of client managers. Conversely, when liability costs decrease due to legal reform, auditors can maximize their utilities by adopting less conservative audit procedures and judgments, providing client managers with greater accounting discretion.
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995
The Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995 includes three major provisions most relevant to the auditing industry: (1) fair share proportionate liability, (2) deployment of damage caps, and (3) fraud detection and disclosure by auditors. The first provision of PSLRA replaces joint and several liability with fair share proportionate liability. Proportionate liability changes the way damages are allocated to parties in litigation, especially to those with deep pockets. Under proportionate liability, damages are only allocated among wrongdoers in proportion to their "fair share." When no wrongdoing is present, plaintiffs have no incentive to sue an auditor solely because the auditor has resources. Auditors are jointly and severally liable only if they knowingly violate securities laws. The second provision of PSLRA prescribes caps limiting damages that liable parties pay to the plaintiffs. The most important feature of this provision is to limit damage awards to plaintiffs to the difference between the purchase or sale price and the mean trading price during the 90-day period starting on the date the market was made aware that a misstatement of information had occurred.
In general, both provisions above reduce the expected litigation losses of defendant auditors. However, there are those (Donovan 1996; Kahn and Metcalfe 1996; King and Schwartz 1997) who argue that the actual benefits to auditors may be reduced by certain litigation strategies used by plaintiffs' attorneys that would effectively circumvent the new law. Plaintiffs in some instances, for example, could bring their lawsuits in state court rather than federal court where joint and several liability apply. Plaintiffs could also attempt to show that auditors acted knowingly in certifying fraudulent financial statements so that they should be held jointly and severally liable.
In addition, the passage of PSLRA may have produced an "unanticipated cost" to auditors. The third provision of PSLRA specifies auditors' responsibilities for detecting and disclosing material errors and management fraud, detecting and disclosing illegal acts, identifying and disclosing related-party transactions, and evaluating issuers as a going concern. Pitt and Hardison (1996) argue that PSLRA changed the relationship between the auditor and client managers in a fundamental way. The Act holds auditors responsible not just for fraudulent reporting, but for all illegal acts having financial consequences. Under PSLRA, auditors are not only required to detect illegal acts, but also to assess the monetary implications of these acts, monitor whether management takes remedial steps in a timely and appropriate fashion, and report their findings to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC).
The Net Impact of PSLRA on the Auditing Industry
Overall, however, it is generally believed that due to the elimination of joint and several liability, PSLRA benefited the auditing industry. First, regarding plaintiff's strategy to pursue litigation in state court, in 1998 the passage of the Securities Litigation Uniform Standards Act (SLUSA) made federal court the exclusive venue for securities litigation, effectively closing the door on plaintiff's ability to sue in state court. But even prior to SLUSA, due to lobbying efforts by accountants and others, some states (e.g., Illinois) had initiated legal reform to eliminate joint and several liability (Palmrose 1994) . 1 Second, PSLRA heightened pleading requirements; plaintiffs would have to prove loss causation, outlining those "particular facts" that would prove auditor fraud. They would have to prove that auditors were not just negligent but had intent to defraud the public. Levine and Pritchard (1998) state that due to heightened pleading standards under PSLRA, 60 percent of shareholder fraud cases were dismissed during 1996-1997 compared to 40 percent during 1990-1992. Third, on the point that PSLRA imposes an additional burden on auditors with regard to illegal acts, there is disagreement. Accounting industry lawyers argue that PSLRA only codifies existing rules under GAAS (SAS Nos. 53, 55, and 59; AICPA 1988a AICPA , 1988b AICPA , 1988c and that the new reporting requirements will have little or no impact. They argue that the requirement of directly reporting illegal acts to the SEC only speeds up disclosure that the SEC would have otherwise received in a Form 8-K filing (Donovan 1996) .
Anecdotal (e.g., Savage 2002) as well as empirical evidence supports the view that the benefits to auditors due to PSLRA exceeded the costs. Grundfest and Perino (1997) show that federal lawsuits decreased 30 percent in 1996 compared to the five years prior to PSLRA. Further, Ali and Kallapur (2001) examine stock price reactions to PSLRA for firms in four high-litigation-risk industries and find that stockholders in these industries react negatively to PSLRA, which supports the argument that the net effect of PSLRA is to impose restrictions on stockholders to bring lawsuits against parties with deep pockets.
PSLRA and Incentives of Big 6 Auditors
Several studies provide evidence suggesting that compared to the non-Big 6, Big 6 auditors provide audits of higher quality. Francis et al. (1999) , for example, find that auditees of Big 6 firms report lower amounts of discretionary accruals. Prior literature suggests that one reason for higher quality is simply that Big 6 auditors have deep pockets (DeAngelo 1981; Dye 1993; Menon and Williams 1994) . According to this view, Big 6 auditors face more litigation because they have more resources than other auditors and, therefore, have incentives to maintain high audit quality. If deep pockets are a significant motivation for why Big 6 auditors provide high audit quality, then by reducing damage awards and lawsuits, PSLRA possibly diminishes incentives of Big 6 firms to maintain that level of quality. Therefore, as implied by Francis et al.'s (1999) study, discretionary accruals of auditees of Big 6 firms could be expected to increase after PSLRA. While managers have incentives to lower income at times, litigation risk primarily emanates from overstating income (e.g., Lys and Watts 1994; Heninger 2001) . We, therefore, expect the effect of PSLRA to be especially on income-increasing discretionary accruals and make these accruals the main focus of our examination.
While Chan and Pae (1998), discussed earlier, do not explicitly refer to Big 6 auditors, supporting evidence in their paper indicates that Big 6 auditors benefit most from the elimination of joint and several liability (see, for example, Chan and Pae 1998, footnote 1). Indeed, as previously indicated, Big 6 firms were most affected by the litigation explosion prior to 1995 and lobbied hard for the passage of PSLRA. Under joint and several liability, claims against Big 6 firms amounted to $30 billion in 1992, which was in excess of their total partners' capital (Solomon and Berton 1993) . As a result of the explosion in litigation, Big 6 firms also experienced dramatic increases in insurance premiums (Andersen et al. 1992) .
There are no comparable data that provide direct evidence on litigation costs of non-Big 6 firms due to joint and several liability. However, prior literature (e.g., Shu 2000) argues that non-Big 6 firms have significantly less "wealth-at-risk" due to litigation (see also Raghunandan and Rama 1999) . Similarly, Johnson et al. (1995) argue that small audit firms face significantly less litigation liability costs and do not have the incentives that large audit firms do to lobby for litigation reform limiting liability. While, as noted, there are no data on lobbying costs of non-Big 6 firms, it is clear that Big 6 auditors had greater incentives to lobby for reform limiting liability. 2 Based on this discussion, we form the following hypothesis relating auditor type to changes in client managers' accounting discretion due to PSLRA: H1: Ceteris paribus, subsequent to changes in the legal environment due to the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act of 1995, reporting flexibility increases more for Big 6 than non-Big 6 clients.
A different but not mutually exclusive view of why Big 6 firms provide high-quality audits is that Big 6 auditors with their established brand-names signal to current and prospective auditees their reputation, the value of which is significantly reduced when audit failures or audit errors occur (e.g., Franz et al. 1998) . We acknowledge that in making the arguments in the foregoing paragraphs, we have assumed that the value of auditor reputation is constant before and after PSLRA. It is possible that, absent the external force of legal liability, auditors' reputations become more important in assuring the quality of audit work. Thus, while the risk of litigation may have decreased after PSLRA, there could be a greater cost in terms of reputation loss due to opportunistic behavior of auditors. Contrary to the stated hypothesis, this competing theory predicts that discretionary accruals would reduce or remain unaffected after PSLRA. Results supporting the hypothesis would, therefore, be even more robust because they would show significant results even after an offsetting effect taking place due to a competing theory. There are others such as Palmrose (1988) who suggest, however, that auditor reputation is negatively affected when there are audit failures and lawsuits against auditors. As the risk of litigation decreased after PSLRA, auditors' expected value of lost reputation due to lawsuits may also have decreased.
RESEARCH DESIGN Measures of Accounting Discretion
As discussed, the main proxy for client managers' reporting flexibility in this study is incomeincreasing discretionary accruals estimated using the Modified Jones model (Dechow et al. 1995) . Dechow et al. (1995) and Bartov et al. (2001) show that the Modified Jones model is superior to other models for measuring discretionary accruals and detecting earnings management. Model parameters are estimated using cross-sectional rather than time-series data because this mitigates problems due to data unavailability for some estimation periods and structural changes in firms over time. It allows us to "control" for changing economic conditions and events that affect discretionary accruals over time, as well as examine samples of firms with a short history thereby reducing survivorship bias. For each firm i, for each year, discretionary accruals (DACC) are estimated by subtracting the predicted level of nondiscretionary accruals (NDAP ) from total accruals (TA ), i.e., DACC i = TA i -NDAP i . 3 Incomeincreasing (absolute) discretionary accruals are denoted as INCRDACC (|DACC|).
Auditor-Characteristics Used to Explain Client Managers' Accounting Discretion
As discussed, empirical evidence indicates that Big 6 auditors provide higher levels of audit assurance and prefer conservative accounting when compared to non-Big 6 auditors. These auditors also are likely to have greater influence on managers' accounting policies than non-Big 6 auditors (Becker et al. 1998; DeFond and Subramanyam 1998; Francis et al. 1999) . Therefore, we include a variable, AUDTYPE, which takes a value of 1 for Big 6 auditors, and 0 otherwise.
To examine how changes in expected litigation costs in the auditing industry affect client managers' accounting discretion after PSLRA, a dummy variable, PSLRA95, takes a value of 1 for years following PSLRA (1996, 1997, and 1998), and 0 otherwise (1992, 1993, and 1994 ). An interaction dummy variable, HIAUDEXP*PSLRA95, is used to test whether accounting discretion increases for client managers of Big 6 auditors (HIAUDEXP is 1 for Big 6 auditors, and 0 otherwise) after PSLRA. As discussed, PSLRA is mainly expected to impact Big 6 auditors. Therefore, we also include a second interaction dummy variable, LOWAUDEXP*PSLRA95, representing the interaction of non-Big 6 auditors (LOWAUDEXP is 1 for non-Big 6 auditors, and 0 otherwise) with PSLRA95, which investigates whether client managers of non-Big 6 auditors were less affected by PSLRA.
We include auditor tenure, AUDTEN, to control for the possibility that client managers' accounting discretion may be influenced by how long an auditor is retained in an engagement. In recent years the relation between auditor tenure and earnings management has been a topic of much debate. In this study auditor tenure is the number of years that an auditor remains with the same client firm, beginning with 1981. Values of this variable range from a low of 1 to a high of 18. The AICPA (1992) argues that audit quality increases with auditor tenure and that mandatory rotation would most likely impair audit quality and result in higher startup costs. In support, St. Pierre and Anderson (1984) find that auditors of new clients (three years or less on the engagement) commit more errors and experience higher legal risk than other auditors. Results in Davis et al. (2000) show that as auditor tenure increases from 6 to 15 years, client managers have less reporting flexibility. In contrast, a few empirical studies show that as auditor tenure increases, client managers gain more reporting flexibility (Knapp 1991; Deis and Giroux 1992; Copley and Doucet 1993) . The SEC has also expressed concerns that auditor independence may be compromised when auditors remain with their clients for long periods (Levitt 1998; Turner 1999; Johnson 1999) . 4
Other Control Variables Used to Explain Client Managers' Accounting Discretion
Before testing the hypothesis, we also control for several factors unrelated to auditors' characteristics (hereafter collectively called CNTRL). Zimmerman (1986, 1990) suggest that bonuses provide managers with strong incentives to manage earnings, while DeFond and Jiambalvo (1993) argue that management compensation is positively related to earnings growth. Therefore, we include the percentage change in net income from the current to the following year. 5 We include the square root of the issuances of debt and equity as a control variable motivated by previous research, which has found that prior to securities offerings, managers have incentives to use income-increasing discretionary accruals (Rangan 1998; Teoh et al. 1998) . Barth et al. (1999) and Dechow and Skinner (2000) argue that growth firms have capital-market incentives to manage earnings to meet earnings' benchmarks. To control for firm growth, the percentage changes in total assets were used. We include a dummy variable, LOSSD, which equals 1 when firms report losses, and is 0 otherwise, because of research suggesting that managers of firms experiencing losses use discretionary accruals opportunistically (e.g., DeAngelo and DeAngelo 1994; Burgstahler and Dichev 1997) . Several studies indicate that discretionary accruals may be related to firm size. For example, Lang and Lundholm (1993) suggest that large firms have incentives to disclose financial information more accurately to avoid litigation, which suggests that discretionary accruals may be negatively associated with client size. To control for firm size, the log of total assets is included. Finally, Altman's Z-score is used to control for various aspects of a firm's financial condition. Literature suggests that financially troubled firms use more aggressive accounting procedures to avoid violation of debt covenants (Watts and Zimmerman 1986; Healy and Palepu 1990; Sweeney 1994) . 6 The following regression model is then used to test H1:
EMPIRICAL TESTS Sample Selection
The sample period is from 1992 to 1998. We begin by selecting all firms (excluding American Depository Receipts) on Compustat during this period that had contracted with an auditor. On December 22, 1995, PSLRA became law when the U.S. Senate voted to override President Clinton's veto. We exclude the transition year 1995 from our sample to avoid any confounding. We then required that all variables used in the regression be available over the entire sample period for the firms in our sample. We impose this requirement so that we can perform our analyses on the same set of firms before and after PSLRA. While this reduced the sample to 15,600 observations, it gave us complete data for 2,600 firms, each of which appears six times in our data set.
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive statistics for variables used in our regression are presented in Table 2 , Panels A and B, provides parametric t-and nonparametric Wilcoxon rank sum (WRS) tests for differences between Big 6 and non-Big 6 accounting firms for income-increasing, incomedecreasing, and absolute discretionary accruals. It shows that both before (Panel A) and after (Panel B) PSLRA, signed and absolute discretionary accruals of client managers with Big 6 auditors are statistically significantly smaller than those of client managers with non-Big 6 auditors, suggesting that, on average, auditees of Big 6 firms have less reporting flexibility and are more conservative.
Next, comparing before with after PSLRA, we find that income-increasing discretionary accruals (INCRDACC) of Big 6 auditees increase on average by $9.028 million (0.58 percent of total assets) compared to $1.556 million of income-decreasing discretionary accruals (0.10 percent of total assets). In addition, for Big 6 auditees, both mean and median increases in income-increasing discretionary accruals are statistically significant using both the t-test (t-value = 2.57) and the Wilcoxon test (Z = 3.14), but these tests do not show statistically significant increases in incomedecreasing or absolute discretionary accruals.
For non-Big 6 auditees, the mean increase in income-increasing discretionary accruals was $0.458 million (0.55 percent of total assets), which was not statistically significant using both tests. However, there was a reduction of $1.166 million (1.40 percent of total assets) in the mean value of income-decreasing accruals, which was statistically significant using the t-test (t-value = 2.26) and the Wilcoxon test (Z = 2.06).
These results are consistent with our hypothesis that predicts that Big 6 auditors who are exposed to higher litigation risk with regard to income-increasing accruals in particular, experience more relief due to PSLRA. It appears puzzling that our results show that non-Big 6 auditees reduce their use of income-decreasing accruals after PSLRA. One possible explanation is that the fraud provision (third provision of PSLRA discussed earlier) may have acted as a deterrent, inducing nonBig 6 auditees to reduce their income-decreasing accruals or report a higher income. However, this explanation appears to be contrary to prior findings showing that auditors are more likely to be sued for using accruals to report higher income than lower income. A more likely explanation may be that Table 2 results based on univariate tests do not adequately control for other factors affecting managers' accounting discretion. We return to this point in the next section where we use a multivariate test to control for other factors affecting accruals, as well as, further exploring this result by partitioning the sample according to firms facing a high risk of litigation. Table 3 , Column A, provides results of our main regression using income-increasing discretionary accruals (INCRDACC) as the dependent variable. In Column B the dependent variable is absolute discretionary accruals (|DACC|). The regression in Column B is provided in response to Francis et al.
Regression Results

TABLE 1 (continued)
Variable Definitions: AUDTYPE = 1 if Big 6 auditor, and 0 otherwise; AUDTEN = the number of years that an auditor remains with the same client firm; PSLRA95 = legal environment change dummy: 1 for years following PSLRA, and 0 otherwise; HIAUDEXP*PSLRA95 = interaction between Big 6 auditor and PSLRA 95; LOWAUDEXP*PSLRA95 = interaction between non-Big 6 auditor and PSLRA 95; CAPITAL = square root of long-term debt and stock issuance during the current and following year; SIZE = natural log of total assets; ∆NI = percentage change in net income from the current to the following year; GROWTH = percentage change in total assets from the previous to the current year; LOSSD = 1 if a firm has a loss, and 0 otherwise; and ZSCORE = Altman's (1983) Z-score. (1999), among others, who suggest that managers want discretion to use both income-increasing and -decreasing accruals. 8 Column A of Table 3 results show that the auditor characteristic that is very strongly related to discretionary accruals is AUDTYPE (Big 6 vs. non-Big 6). The coefficient on AUDTYPE is negative and statistically significant at all conventional levels of testing, suggesting that reporting flexibility of Big 6 auditees is less than that of non-Big 6 auditees. Similar to Francis et al. (1999) we interpret this result to indicate that Big 6 firms provide audits of higher quality. If deep pockets are why Big 6 firms provide higher quality of audits, then H1 suggests that we might expect a reduction in audit quality after PSLRA. The coefficient of most interest to this study is γ 1 , which is found to be positive and highly statistically significant. This indicates that after PSLRA, reporting flexibility of Big 6 auditees increases-which is consistent with a reduction in audit quality by Big 6 firms due to the elimination of joint and several liability. Furthermore, the multivariate regression shows that the effect of PSLRA on reporting flexibility of non-Big 6 auditees is statistically insignificant (γ 2 is statistically not different from 0) and much smaller in magnitude than that for Big 6 auditees (F-value = 4.15; p-value = 0.041, two-tailed). We believe that by controlling for other factors affecting discretionary accruals, multivariate tests provide more reliable evidence than univariate tests reported in Table 2 .
With regard to the control variables, statistically significant coefficients were found for firm size, Z-score, stock and debt issuances, asset growth, and the loss dummy. Consistent with prior research, these results suggest that reporting flexibility is higher in small and growth firms, in firms experiencing losses and issuing capital, and those in poor financial condition. Finally, consistent with Davis et al. (2000) the coefficient on AUDTEN is negative and statistically significant suggesting that firms appear to have less reporting flexibility over time with the same auditor. 9 Table 3 , Column B results are similar to those discussed above. Confirming expectations, they show that the hypothesis is more strongly supported when income-increasing rather than absolute discretionary accruals are used in the regression analyses. 10
TABLE 3 (continued)
*, **, and *** indicate significance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels, respectively. t-value is based on a two-tailed test. Variable Definitions: INCRDACC = income-increasing discretionary accruals; |DACC| = absolute discretionary accruals; AUDTYPE = 1 if Big 6 auditor, and 0 otherwise; AUDTEN = the number of years that an auditor remains with the same client firm; PSLRA95 = legal environment change dummy, which is 1 for years following PSLRA, and 0 otherwise; HIAUDEXP*PSLRA95 = interaction between Big 6 auditor and PSLRA 95; LOWAUDEXP*PSLRA95 = interaction between non-Big 6 auditor and PSLRA 95; CAPITAL = square root of long-term debt and stock issuance during the current and following year; SIZE = natural log of total assets; ∆NI = percentage change in net income from the current to the following year; GROWTH = percentage change in total assets from the previous to the current year; LOSSD = 1 if a firm has a loss, and 0 otherwise; and ZSCORE = Altman's (1983) Z-score. 8 The SEC does not view the use of income-decreasing accruals as appropriate. Most recently, the SEC took legal steps against Microsoft Corp., for inappropriately using income-decreasing accruals (Wall Street Journal 2002) . 9 A series of dummy variables was created representing auditor tenure for years 5 to 9, 10 to 14, 15 to 18. Similar to Davis et al. (2000) we find that the incremental effect on discretionary accruals of tenure of 15 to 18 years relative to tenure of 1 to 4 years is positive, while the incremental effect of tenure of 5 to 9 years and 10 to 14 years is negative. Because the results do not change using these tenure dummies, only the results using the most parsimonious regression model are reported. 10 We examined regression results in Table 3 , Columns A and B, for multicollinearity problems by checking variance inflation factors and condition indices. These were well within acceptable levels in both regressions.
Sensitivity Tests
A concern with these tests is whether we can conclusively claim that the increases in discretionary accruals in the post-1995 period are attributable to the passage of PSLRA. 11 For example, it may be that discretionary accruals have been on an upward trend during our sample period and that our tests reflect this trend rather than the effects of PSLRA. We provide evidence on this issue by comparing annual changes in mean and median income-increasing discretionary accruals before and after PSLRA. We find that, in general, these discretionary accruals are "stable" over the sample period (results not reported). Specifically, both mean and median annual changes during the pre-PSLRA ( ) and post-PSLRA (1996 periods were statistically insignificant, except for the change between 1997 and 1998. To rule out the possibility that the increases in the discretionary accruals from 1997 to 1998 are driving the result, the regression was run removing 1998 from the sample, as well as including a year dummy for 1998; results similar to those reported in Table 3 were obtained. An interesting question, however, is why discretionary accruals increased during 1998. One possibility is SLUSA passed in 1998, which further restricts the ability of litigants to bring nonmeritorious lawsuits against auditors and other corporate defendants.
We also examined the robustness of our regression results to alternative specifications. Because of concerns that LOWAUDEXP*PSLRA95 and HIAUDEXP*PSLRA95 are both capturing general economic changes over time, we estimated a regression model, excluding LOWAUDEXP*PSLRA95, and instead including a year dummy for 1995 (to capture general economy effects) and HIAUDEXP*PSLRA95. We found that the coefficient on the year dummy for 1995 was statistically insignificant and, while that on HIAUDEXP*PSLRA95 was positive and statistically significant, it is consistent with our earlier findings (results not reported).
Next, motivated by concerns about the high correlation between AUDTYPE and LOWAUDEXP*PSLRA95 (ρ = -0.68 for the sample of income-increasing accruals), we separate the sample according to clients of Big 6 and non-Big 6 auditors and analyze separately the effect of PSLRA on each group using a year dummy for 1995 (PSLRA95). The findings are supportive of Table 3 showing that PSLRA had a statistically significant (insignificant) effect on income-increasing discretionary accruals of clients of Big 6 (non-Big 6) auditors (results not reported).
Finally, Stice's (1991) litigation score was used to partition the income-increasing discretionary accruals sample into two groups: 12 firms facing high litigation risk (HISUIT) and those facing low litigation risk (LOWSUIT ). We expect PSLRA to provide greater relief to those firms most targeted by lawsuits and predict that those firms will exhibit a greater increase in reporting flexibility after PSLRA. 13 In support of H1, we find that for Big 6 auditees, the coefficient on HISUIT*PSLRA95 measuring the impact of PSLRA on high-litigation-risk firms is statistically significant (t-value = 4.45) and about 3.5 times as large as that on the low-litigation-risk firms (LOWSUIT*PSLRA95) 11 While the sensitivity tests below are only for income-increasing discretionary accruals, the replication of these tests using absolute discretionary accruals provided qualitatively similar results. 12 This methodology discussed below has been used by others such as Krishnan and Krishnan (1997) . For each firm, each year, we compute a litigation score using model coefficients estimated by Stice (1991) . Specifically, litigation score for each firm, each year is: 315.74 -0.273*A/R + 0.423*INV + 1.053*GROWTH -0.18*FC + 2.276*NAME -1.517* TEN-URE -323.44*INDEPNT + 2725.8*VAR + 0.269*MV, where A/R is the ratio of accounts receivable to total assets, INV is the ratio of inventory to total assets, GROWTH is the change in sales for client, FC is the Z-score of the client, NAME is the quality classification of the auditor (Big 6 = 1, non-Big 6 = 0), TENURE is 1 if audit tenure is more than three years and 0 otherwise, INDEPNT is (1 -client sales/total sales) of all clients of a given auditor, VAR is the variance of abnormal returns for the client, and MV is the natural log of the market value of the firm. The stock market return data needed to compute VAR is not available on CRSP for 4,050 observations. HISUIT (LOWSUIT) takes value 1 if for a given year a firm's litigation score is greater than or equal to (smaller than) the median litigation score of the entire sample, 0 otherwise. 13 Prior to 1995, high-tech stocks were also frequent targets of lawsuits. Using SIC codes in Ali and Kallapur (2001) we found evidence that reporting flexibility increased more for high-tech than other firms. However, the difference in increased reporting flexibility between the two groups of firms was marginal, consistent with findings of a study by PricewaterhouseCoopers (2000).
(results not reported). 14 With regard to non-Big 6 auditees, we suggested earlier that univariate results in Table 2 could be interpreted as indicating that the fraud provision (third provision) of PSLRA had a strong impact on these firms. If true, then we would expect PSLRA to have a significant effect on income-increasing discretionary accruals of non-Big 6 auditees facing a high risk of litigation. However, the results show that coefficients on post-PSLRA high-and low-litigation dummies are both small in magnitude and statistically insignificant. CONCLUSION On December 22, 1995, Congress enacted the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act (PSLRA), which substantially revises federal securities laws with regard to litigants' ability to sue auditors and other parties for securities fraud. The passage of PSLRA was due in large measure to a multiyear effort by numerous parties that included the Big 6 auditing firms facing litigation of unprecedented magnitude. The most significant reform of PSLRA affecting the auditing industry was the elimination of joint and several liability and its replacement with proportionate liability.
There was heated debate as to whether the elimination of joint and several liability was in stockholders' interests. Big 6 firms argued that as a result of the litigation explosion and joint and several liability, the supply of auditing services would decrease. Opponents, however, argued that PSLRA would make it more difficult for investors to sue. Further PSLRA might affect incentives for auditors to reduce the quality of services in monitoring management reporting. Our main test of this hypothesis consists of examining whether PSLRA impacted accounting discretion of client managers of Big 6 and non-Big 6 firms, measured as income-increasing discretionary accruals. The results provide evidence consistent with increased reporting flexibility by client managers of Big 6 firms after PSLRA. These results are robust to different model specifications and tests using additional partitions of data.
As is the case for most studies that examine the impact of regulatory events, this study is subject to an important limitation. Because the impact of PSLRA occurs simultaneously for all firms, we cannot conclusively rule out that some economic event(s) other than PSLRA is driving the results. We also acknowledge that, similar to Chan and Pae (1998), an implicit assumption we make is that auditor reputation and other parameters affecting audit quality remain constant before and after PSLRA. To the extent that these are significant confounding factors, the results of this paper must be interpreted with caution.
While PSLRA represents a major event for the auditing industry, there have been few empirical studies examining the effect of PSLRA on auditor incentives and practices. This study contributes by providing useful information to both practitioners and policymakers on the effect of changes in auditor incentives induced by changes in the legal environment due to PSLRA. This study thus appears relevant to a current debate among securities law experts as to whether the recent wave of accounting debacles can be attributed to changes stemming from PSLRA (e.g., Savage 2002) . For example, some critics of PSLRA have charged that by limiting culpability, the law may have contributed to Enron's failure. There have been calls by some lawmakers in the wake of Enron to amend or repeal critical sections of PSLRA, including replacing proportionate with joint and several liability. (See Congress Daily 2002; Lee 2002.) Future research is needed to examine how PSLRA affected other quality aspects of financial reporting, such as number of restatements and going concern opinions, and litigation against auditors, particularly non-Big 6 auditors about whom there is scant data. The economic impact on stock prices of changes in accounting discretion due to the features of the legal environment is another topic for future work. Finally, research could be conducted to provide direct evidence of manager and auditor behavior as a result of changes in the legal system using experimental or case study methods.
